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Abstract My aim is to question whether the introduction of new technologies in
society may be considered to be genuine experiments. I will argue that they are not,
at least not in the sense in which the notion of experiment is being used in the
natural and social sciences. If the introduction of a new technology in society is
interpreted as an experiment, then we are dealing with a notion of experiment that
differs in an important respect from the notion of experiment as used in the natural
and social sciences. This difference shows itself most prominently when the func-
tioning of the new technological system is not only dependent on technological
hardware but also on social ‘software’, that is, on social institutions such as ap-
propriate laws, and actions of operators of the new technological system. In those
cases we are not dealing with ‘simply’ the introduction of a new technology, but
with the introduction of a new socio-technical system. I will argue that if the
introduction of a new socio-technical system is considered to be an experiment, then
the relation between the experimenter and the system on which the experiment is
performed differs significantly from the relation in traditional experiments in the
natural and social sciences. In the latter experiments it is assumed that the ex-
perimenter is not part of the experimental system and is able to intervene in and
control the experimental system from the outside. With regard to the introduction of
new socio-technical systems the idea that there is an experimenter outside the socio-
technical system who intervenes in and controls that system becomes problematic.
From that perspective we are dealing with a different kind of experiment.
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Introduction
Following Martin and Schinzinger (1989) the introduction of new technologies in
society has often been interpreted as performing experiments on society. One of the
main reasons for doing so is that the effects of new technologies on society are
usually hard to predict. In the absence of reliable knowledge about these effects, an
experimental approach may be appropriate for at least the following two reasons.
First, experiments are performed to learn and so treating technological innovations
as experiments calls for a close monitoring of the societal effects of a new
technology; without a close monitoring nothing will be learned about the possible
effects of new technologies. But apart from learning through close monitoring the
experimental approach is of crucial importance for a second reason. Experiments
are usually performed under controlled conditions such that it is possible to stop an
experiment. If the monitored effects of the introduction of a new technology are, for
whatever reasons (technical, social, moral, economic etcetera), not desirable, and if
the introduction of the new technology is set up as a real experiment, then it should
be possible in principle to stop the experiment.
If following Martin and Schinzinger the introduction of a new technology is
considered to be a genuine experiment on society, then this raises interesting ethical
questions. For instance, the question arises whether, by analogy to medical
experiments on human beings, the notion of informed consent may be applied to
these experiments on society, since human beings are involved [see (Martin and
Schinzinger 1989, Ch. 3)]. It is not my intention to enter here into a discussion of
these ethical issues. In my opinion, a proper discussion of these ethical issues
requires first of all a closer examination of the idea that the introduction of new
technologies may be looked upon as real experiments on society. That is what I
intend to do in this paper.
My aim is to question whether the introduction of new technologies into society
may be considered to be genuine experiments. I will argue that they are not, at least
not in the sense in which the notion of experiment is being used in the natural and
social sciences. If the introduction of a new technology in society is interpreted as
an experiment, then we are dealing with a notion of experiment that differs in an
important respect from the notion of experiment as used in the natural and social
sciences. This difference shows itself most prominently when the functioning of the
new technological system is not only dependent on technological hardware but also
on social ‘software’, that is, on social institutions such as appropriate laws, and
actions of operators of the new technological system. In those cases we are not
dealing with ‘simply’ the introduction of a new technology, but with the
introduction of a new socio-technical system. I will argue that if the introduction
of a new socio-technical system is considered to be an experiment, then the relation
between the experimenter and the system on which the experiment is performed
differs significantly from the relation in traditional experiments in the natural and
social sciences. In the latter experiments it is assumed that the experimenter is not
part of the experimental system and is able to intervene in and control the
experimental system from the outside. With regard to the introduction of new socio-
technical systems the idea that there is an experimenter outside the socio-technical
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system who intervenes in and controls that system becomes problematic. From that
perspective we are then dealing with different kinds of experiments. In my opinion,
discussions about the possibility or desirability of the application of the traditional
moral requirement of informed consent to technological innovations as experiments
on society will have to take into account this difference in the kinds of experiments.
Experiments and Control in the Natural Sciences
I will start with a brief look at the various kinds of experiments performed in the
natural sciences. Depending on so to speak the locus of the experiment we may
distinguish between thought experiments which take place in the mind, compu-
tational/simulation experiments in computers and experiments in the ‘real world’;
the latter may take place in a laboratory setting or, so to speak, in the wild (in the
following I will focus on laboratory experiments). The epistemic role of thought
and computational experiments has been and still is contested, one of the issues
being whether or not they lead to new knowledge about the world [see, for instance
(Mach 1976 (1897); Kuhn 1977)]. This is not the case for experiments performed
in the real world; the epistemic relevance of the outcomes of these experiments is
not disputed. Another distinction, which cuts across this one, is between qualitative
and quantitative experiments. Qualitative experiments show the existence of
particular phenomena, such as the quantum-interference of electrons in the double
slit experiment. Quantitative experiments focus on quantitative relations between
physical quantities and generally make use of the principle of parameter variation
(here we may think of Boyle’s experiments with gases to show the relation
between pressure and volume that bears his name). Again another distinction is
based on the relation between experiment and theory. Depending on whether an
experiment is intended to explore phenomena without the guidance of theory or is
intended to test a theory, experiments may be divided, only schematically of
course, into exploratory and hypothesis testing.
There are at least two reasons for performing laboratory experiments in the
natural sciences:
1. experiments enable the study of spontaneously occurring physical objects and
phenomena under conditions that do not occur spontaneously in the world; and
2. in experiments conditions may be created for the occurrence of physical objects
and phenomena that do not occur spontaneously in the world; these objects and
systems can therefore be studied only under experimental conditions.
Thus, the experimenter creates the appropriate conditions for studying physical
phenomena and objects and may even create those phenomena and systems
themselves, again by creating the appropriate conditions for their occurrence. These
conditions are human-made and therefore artificial; that, however, does not imply
that the physical objects and phenomena themselves are human creations and thus
artificial (……).
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What I am particularly interested in here is to what extent the experimenter has
control over the system on which the experiment is performed. In this respect there
are significant differences between thought, computer and laboratory experiments.
In thought experiments the physical system under study and the conditions under
which it is studied are created in the imagination and the experimenter has in
principle total control over the system and these conditions; (s)he is even in a
position to study physical systems under conditions that cannot be realized in the
world (for instance, by assuming the validity of imaginary physical laws). However,
there are restrictions on what kind of systems can be studied fruitfully in thought
experiments. These restrictions find their origin in the reasoning powers of the
experimenter; it is, for instance, no use to perform thought experiments on systems
that are so complex that it is not possible to draw any interesting conclusion about
their behavior.
More or less the same applies to computer experiments (simulations). Prima
facie, the experimenter appears to have almost unlimited freedom to define the
target system and its conditions. However, also in this case there are restrictions; the
freedom of the experimenter is not unlimited due to constraints imposed by the
computational device (computer). The computational power of the device puts
limits on the kinds of target systems that may be simulated and therefore puts limits
on the control of the experimenter over the target system and its conditions. These
limits on the experimenter’s control find their origin in the technological limits
(related to hardware and software) of the computational device.
When it comes to laboratory experiments, technological constraints determine
the control of the experimenter over what kind of system may be studied under
what kind of experimental conditions. Now it is not possible to study objects or
systems that contradict the laws of nature, as is the case for thought and
computational experiments. In the limit case where the scientist has no control
whatsoever over the object of study and the conditions under which it is studied
(e.g. the occurrence of a supernova) the scientist is dependent on Nature to perform
the ‘experiment’ so as to make it possible to study the system or phenomenon (see
Morgan’s notion of Nature’s experiment (Morgan 2013). This does not mean that
the scientist is condemned to the role of a totally passive observer and that no
issues of control emerge. The observation of (naturally occurring) phenomena may
involve all kinds of measurement equipment that have to be controlled during the
observations.
Note that in these various kinds of experiments the control of the experimenter
stretches no further than control over what kind of system is studied and the
conditions under which it is to be studied. The experimenter does not have any
control over the behavior of the system under those conditions, that is, s/he has no
control over the outcome of the experiment.1 If that would be the case, the
1 Note that this may not be true for thought experiments. Think of Newton’s famous bucket experiment;
Newton simply assumed what would be the outcome of his thought experiment, namely, that the surface
of a bucket of water rotating in absolute space would be curved. Mach questioned whether that would




performance of the experiment would lose its rationale: why perform an experiment
if the outcome can be controlled and consequently predicted with certainty.2
Experiments and Control in the Social Sciences
Let us now move over to experiments in the social sciences.3 Walker and Willer
(2007, p. 25) distinguish between two ‘‘fundamentally different types of ex-
periments’’ in the (social) sciences, namely empiricist and theory-driven experiments,
each of which has its own method. This distinction runs more or less parallel to the
above distinction between exploratory and hypothesis testing experiments. Empiricist
experiments aim at making generalizations from observations, whereas theory-driven
experiments aim at testing theories. The examples of experiments they discuss all fall
into the above category of laboratory experiments. They do not refer to thought
experiments or computational experiments; it appears that at least the latter also have
come to play an important role in the social sciences. In the following I will focus on
laboratory experiments only.
What emerges from the discussion of laboratory experiments in the social
sciences in part I of Webster and Sell (2007a) is that it is all about control.
According to Webster and Sell (2007b, p. 8) ‘‘a study is an experiment only when a
particular ordering occurs: when an investigator controls the level of independent
variables before measuring the level of dependent variables.’’ Walker and Willer
(2007, p. 25) state that a laboratory experiment is ‘‘an inquiry for which the
investigator plans, builds, or otherwise controls the conditions under which
phenomena are observed and measured…’’. According to Thye (2007, p. 66) ‘‘The
confluence of three features makes experimental research unique in scientific
inquiry: random assignment, manipulation, and controlled measurement.’’ All of
these three features, including random assignment, are about control; the notion of
the control group is based on randomization and the ‘‘first and most straightforward
type of control is the control group’’ (Thye 2007, p. 79). Random assignment of
persons in the experimental and control group is intended to eliminate (which is a
specific form of control) the influence of spurious variables. This focus on
controlling variables in laboratory experiments is of course closely related to the
complexity of social phenomena in the sense of the number of potentially relevant
variables for the phenomenon under study. In order to be able to draw reliable
conclusions about the relation between the independent variables and the dependent
variables all other variables that may have an influence on the dependent variables
have to be kept constant.
The control of social phenomena in laboratory experiments has advantages and
disadvantages. According to Webster and Sell (2007b, p. 11):
2 This relates directly to the remark above that the physical phenomena themselves, although created in
the experiment, are themselves natural phenomena and not artificial.
3 The following is mainly based on the discussion of experiments in the social sciences in part I of
Laboratory Experiments in the Social Sciences edited by Webster and Sell (2007a).
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‘‘The greatest benefits of experiments reside in the fact that they are artificial.
That is, experiments allow observation in a situation that has been designed
and created by the investigators rather than one that occurs in nature.
Artificiality means that a well-designed experiment can incorporate all the
theoretically presumed causes of certain phenomena while eliminating or
minimizing factors that have not been theoretically identified as causal.’’
Because the conditions are controlled, experiments may be replicated in order to
test the ‘‘internal’’ validity of the outcomes. The disadvantage of artificiality is that
it raises issues about generalizability and ‘‘external’’ validity: to what extent may
the results from experiments be generalized to situations outside the laboratory
settings? Internal and external validities are more or less in tension with each other:
the more the conditions in the laboratory are artificial, that is, are different from the
conditions in natural settings, the better it is for establishing interval validity, but the
more problematic it may be for external validity (that is, for situations outside the
laboratory) (Walker and Willer 2007, p. 51).
The Traditional Control Paradigm for Experiments
If we compare the nature and role of experiments in the natural and social sciences,
it is interesting to note, for a start, that Walker and Willer explicitly state (p. 52) that
‘‘theory-driven experiments and the application of well-supported theory outside the
lab are exactly the same in the physical and social sciences.’’ I will not enter into a
discussion whether or not this is indeed the case. Suffice it here to remark that
discussions about the nature and role experiments in the natural and social sciences
are not conducted on ‘‘exactly the same’’ lines; whereas issues about artificiality and
internal and external validity play a prominent role in discussions about experiments
in the social sciences, they are virtually absent in the natural sciences.4 Whether or
not this meta-level difference is due to differences in the ‘logic’ or method of
experiments in both cases or is due to difference in features of the subject matter
studied (e.g., the ‘complexity’ of the subject matter) in the experiments remains to
be seen.
Here I will focus on a feature that experiments in the natural and social sciences
appear to have in common, namely their focus on control. In this respect there
seems to be no significant difference between experiments in the natural and the
social sciences. In both cases the experimenter strives for (total) control over the
experiment. But what does the expression ‘‘control over the experiment’’ mean? In
order to clarify this we have to carefully distinguish between two different forms of
control. One form concerns control over the kind of system on which experiments
are to be performed. In laboratory settings the kind of experimental system is
usually designed and created by the experimenter; taking into account techno-
logical, social/ethical and other kinds of constraints she decides on the basis of her
research interests how to configure the system on which the experiments will be
4 A notable exception is (Cartwright 1983).
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performed. The aim of the experiment is to study the behavior of this particular kind
of experimental system, which means that during an experiment the system itself
has to remain the ‘same’, that is, has to remain an instance of that kind of
experimental system. So, once an experiment has been defined and actually started
the experimental system is no longer to be changed. This means that the
experimental system is no longer under control of the experimenter in the sense that
any change in that kind of system implies either a termination of the original
experiment and the start of a new kind of experiment, or simply a termination of the
original experiment.5 However, this does not preclude that the experimenter may
have full control over when to start and when to terminate a particular experiment.
The other form of control pertains to the conditions under which the experimental
system is to be studied, in particular to the interaction between the experimental
system, once it is put in place, and its environment. This kind of control may take
different forms. For instance, the experimenter may be interested in how the
experimental system, starting from a given initial state, behaves in isolation from its
environment. In that case, the experimenter brings the experimental system in the
initial state through controlled interaction between the system and its environment
and once it is in this state she closes off the system from all relevant interaction with
the environment.6 In experiments with independent and dependent variables, the
experimenter sets the independent variable through controlled interaction with the
(environment of) the experimental system. Finally, in experiments involving control
groups, the spurious variables not under direct control are controlled by following
statistical procedures in composing the experimental and control groups (this is an
aspect of the set-up of the experimental system itself)7 and by assuming that the
interaction of the two groups with their environments during the experiment is the
same except for the controlled intervention in or treatment of the (experimental)
group. Under those conditions it is possible to apply a statistical variant of Mill’s
method of difference and conclude that the observed (statistical) difference in the
dependent variable between the experimental and control group is the effect of the
controlled intervention/treatment.8
The basic assumption underlying the above ideas about control of experiments,
both in the natural and social sciences is that the experimenter may control the
experiment either through intervention in the environment of the experimental
system or through intervention in the experimental system itself. The notion of
5 Of course, this raises intricate problems about identity criteria for experimental systems and for
experiments; in the present context the precise nature of these identity criteria, if there are any, is not of
interest; what matters here is the contrast between control over the experimental system and control over
the conditions under which experimental systems are studied.
6 Of course, any experiment involves making observations of (measurements on) the experimental
system so it cannot be totally isolated from its environment.
7 ‘Control over the interaction’ here does not necessarily mean that the experimenter controls/knows who
is part of the experimental group and who of the control group; in order to avoid experimenter’s bias it
may be necessary to apply double blind procedures.
8 ‘‘If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does
not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the
circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or an necessary part of the
cause, of the phenomenon.’’ John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Vol. 1. 1843. p. 455.
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intervention has a clear meaning: the experimenter is not part of the system on which
the experiment is performed nor of its environment. The experimenter operates from
a center of control which is not part of (‘outside’) the experimental system and its
environment. From this vantage point the experimenter controls the experimental
system and its interaction with its environment, which means that she has control
over setting the independent variables and over starting/terminating the experiment. I
will refer to this idea as the traditional control paradigm for experiments.
Of course, the idea of full control underlying this traditional control paradigm is
based on an idealized view of experiments. In actual scientific practice it may be
difficult to realize full control of experiments, in the two senses discussed above.
Even in well-prepared physical experiments within the ‘‘secure’’ walls of
laboratories it may be difficult to eliminate (control) all interfering interactions.
The ideal is to eliminate interferences as much as possible in order to ‘‘purify’’ the
phenomenon under study. If interferences cannot be fully eliminated, then it is very
often still possible to take the effect of the still occurring interferences into account
in interpreting the results of the experiment. The idea of full control becomes even
more problematic in the case of field experiments. According to Schwarz and Krohn
(2011, p. 123) ‘‘perhaps the most striking feature of field experiments is that they
deal with objects ‘‘outside,’’ in an uncontrolled environment.’’ Field experiments, in
agriculture for instance, are often performed precisely because one is interested to
learn more about the behavior of the experimental object/phenomenon under
uncontrolled conditions.9 This means that in field experiments the experimenter tries
to expose the experimental object/phenomenon to the conditions in the ‘‘wild’’.
This, paradoxically, presupposes a form of control on the part of the experimenter,
namely to maintain conditions that correspond as much as possible to the conditions
in the wild. Whenever necessary or desirable it may be possible, moreover, to
register/measure and (partly) control the uncontrolled interactions in order to
analyze their effect on the experimental system. The fact that field experiments are
conducted in an uncontrolled environment does not per se imply that this
environment is uncontrollable.
So, in actual experimental practice it may be difficult and/or not desirable to
exercise full control over the experiment. This, however, does not affect the idea
that the experimenter may intervene in the experiment and that the notion of an
intervention is well-defined. In the next section we will analyze some problems with
the control paradigm in the case of new technologies as experiments that do
undermine the notion of an intervention by the experimenter.
Problems with the Control Paradigm
For a start, let us briefly look at a specific kind of intervention, namely stopping an
experiment; at the beginning of this paper we mentioned the possibility of stopping
9 If indeed Schwarz and Krohn (2011, pp. 123–130) are right that important features of field experiments
include ‘‘individuality, uniqueness, contingency, instability, and also potentially lack of safety’’, then
what is learned from field experiments may not be transferable and generalizable to other situations.
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an experiment as one of the reasons for treating new technologies as experiments.
Strongly associated with the traditional control paradigm, or even as part of it,
comes the idea that the experimenter is able to terminate an experiment when
deemed necessary for whatever reason. I will now examine this idea in more detail,
in particular how this idea plays out in the case the introduction of new technologies
into society are treated as experiments.
First of all, note that stopping an experiment (of whatever kind) does not mean
that it is always possible to restore the experimental system to its initial state. The
experiment may bring about irreversible changes in the experimental system (think
of experiments to test the buckling load of a beam). With regard to the introduction
of new technologies as experiments this means that even if it is assumed that such
an experiment may be stopped, it may bring about irreversible changes in the
experimental system, in particular, irreversible social changes. This possibility of
the occurrence of irreversible changes clearly will have to be taken into account in
discussions on the moral acceptability of the new technology.
Second, as noted earlier, the experimenter has no control over the outcome of the
experiment, that is, over the behavior of the experimental system under given
conditions. Full control over these conditions and over the set-up of the
experimental system does not exclude the occurrence of (totally) unexpected
behavior of the experimental system. Especially when experiments are performed
for the first time unexpected behavior may occur; the more an experiment becomes
stabilized the better the behavior of the experimental system may be ‘‘under
control’’ in the sense of being reliably and accurately predictable. With regard to the
effect of unexpected behavior on the control over the experiment in the senses
discussed above schematically the following two situations may be distinguished:
the unexpected behavior does not or does affect the experimenter’s control over the
experiment, in particular her ability to stop the experiment. In the first case, the
experimenter stays in control and the unexpected behavior may or may not be
a reason to end an experiment prematurely (think of the Stanford prison experiment
that was stopped prematurely for moral reasons). In the second case, the experiment
may get ‘out of control’ because the unexpected behavior of the experimental
system may disrupt the control mechanisms used by the experimenter. So, the
experimenter may lose the possibility of stopping an experiment or to control the
effects of the unexpected behavior of the experimental system (think of the
experimental test that led to the Chernobyl disaster). I see no reason why a similar
situation could not occur with regard to societal experiments with new technologies.
However, apart from a loss of control due to unexpected behavior, there is yet
another reason why control in those experiments may be problematic. This brings
me to my next point.
Third, societal experiments with new technologies involve experimental systems
of a special kind, namely socio-technical systems. In my opinion the notions of an
intervention and of a center of control become problematic when dealing with
experiments on socio-technical systems. Examples of (complex) socio-technical
systems are infrastructural systems such as electric power supply systems or public
transport systems. The behavior of these systems is significantly affected by their
technical components but the functioning of the systems as a whole depends as
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much on the functioning of these technical components as on the functioning of its
social components (legal systems, billing systems, insurance systems etc.) and the
behavior of human actors. Within socio-technical systems the technological and
social subsystems have to be attuned to each other in order for such systems to
operate successfully. Socio-technical systems are hybrid systems consisting of
elements of various kinds, such as natural objects, technical artefacts, human actors
and social entities like organizations and the rules and laws governing the behavior
of human actors and social entities.
Elsewhere (…..) I have argued that the traditional engineering design paradigm is
no longer a suitable basic framework for the design and control of socio-technical
systems. This design paradigm is based on the following three pillars. First, it
assumes that it is possible to clearly separate the object of design from its
environment. Second, it deals exclusively with the designing of hardware (the
manual is more or less taken for granted). What is designed is a material technical
object. Third, it assumes that the behavior of the systems designed can be fully
controlled by controlling the behavior of its parts. Given that the technical artifact is
made up of physical parts, this control amounts to the control of the behavior of
these physical parts through a set of control parameters. Similar to the control
paradigm for experiments, the traditional design paradigm is based on the
assumption that the designer operates from a control center outside the system to
be designed.
For socio-technical systems the assumptions underlying the traditional design
paradigm do not apply and the same reasons that undermine the traditional
engineering design paradigm for these systems also undermine the traditional
control paradigm for experiments with socio-technical systems. To begin with, there
is the problem of where to draw the line between the experimental system and its
environment. If the function of a system is taken to be that which gives the system
cohesion, then it is rather obvious that all elements relevant to the functioning of a
system should be included. But how is the function of, for instance, an electric
power supply system to be defined? Different actors may have different views on
this and may therefore have different opinions on what constitutes part of the
experimental system and what belongs to its environment. In whatever way the
boundaries of the experimental system will be drawn, it is clear that, since we are
dealing with socio-technical systems, by definition human agents and social
institutions will be integral parts of the experimental system. This means, secondly,
that the nature of the experimental system to be controlled changes. Its inner
environment no longer consists of material objects only. The control of these
systems not only involves the control of technical but also of social elements.
However, the behavior of human agents and social institutions cannot be controlled
in the same way that the behavior of technological systems can be controlled. In so
far as human agents perform certain operator roles in socio-technical systems one
may try to control their behavior explicitly by fixing their behavior in terms of
protocols that they have to follow in their operator roles. Or one may try to control
their behavior in more implicit ways by conditioning their working environment
such that it elicits various forms of (desired) behavior. Nevertheless, there appears
to be an essential limit to these forms of control of the behavior of human agents in
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socio-technical systems, a limit that is related to the nature of human agency. The
human agents who fulfill the operator roles in socio-technical systems remain
autonomous agents whose behavior for reasons of their own may deviate from
prescribed protocols in an uncontrollable way. For instance, operators may decide to
start a strike in order to support demands by their labor union, or deviate from a
protocol because following the protocol in a certain situation raises moral issues for
the human agent/operator involved. Of course, the presence of this essential limit in
controllability of socio-technical systems may raise important moral issues when
performing experiments on this kind of systems.10 Finally, various actors from
within the socio-technical system, with their own interpretations of the function of
the system and their role in realizing it, may try to change, control or re-design parts
of the system from within. As a result, the idea of controlling the experimental
system from a control center outside it becomes highly problematic.
There is yet another feature of complex socio-technical systems that threatens the
applicability of the traditional control paradigm for experiments with these systems,
namely the possible occurrence of emergent phenomena. If we assume that
emergent phenomena may occur during experiments with complex socio-technical
systems, then they do pose a real challenge to the traditional control paradigm. The
emergent behavior of a system cannot be reduced, more or less by definition, to the
behavior of its constituent parts. This means that the behavior of the system as a
whole cannot be completely controlled by controlling the behavior of its parts. So,
emergence and control do not go hand in hand. According to Buchli and Santini
(2005, p. 3) ‘‘there is a trade-off between self-organization [and emergence; P. K.]
on one hand and specification or controllability on the other: if you increase the
control over your system you will suppress self-organization capabilities.’’ Such a
new trade-off principle would indeed constitute a significant break with the
traditional design and control paradigms for socio-technical systems with emergent
features. Recent blackouts in electricity systems are often mentioned as examples of
emergent phenomena in complex socio-technical systems. If indeed they are, the
social consequences of these blackouts clearly illustrate the possible moral impact
of emergent phenomena in experiments with socio-technical systems.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that the notions of control
of and intervention into the system on which the experiment is performed will lose
its (standard) meaning when we are dealing with complex socio-technical systems.
In my opinion this feature sets experiments on socio-technical systems apart from
experiments in the natural and social sciences. That we are dealing here with
different kinds of experiments is further supported by the fact that these experiments
on socio-technical systems do not fit into the following table of experimental forms
proposed by Morgan (2013, p. 342) (Table 1):
10 This essential limit in controllability, due to the fact that human beings are part of the experimental
system, already manifests itself in experiments in the social sciences. The idea that the experimenter is
not part of the environment of the experimental system may be difficult to realize in certain experiments
in the social sciences, because subjects participating in an experiment may know that they do so and know
that an experimenter is observing their behavior (i.e., is part of the environment) and this knowledge may
influence their behavior in an uncontrollable way.
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Roughly, Morgan’s notion of design and control pertains to what I have referred
to so far as the control over the set-up of the experimental system and her notion of
intervention to my notion of intervention in the sense of controlled interaction with
the experimental system from its environment. As I have argued above, it is difficult
to apply these notions to socio-technical systems and therefore experiments on this
kind of system do not fit into Morgan’s table of experimental forms.
So, the outcome of our analysis is that if the introduction of new technologies in
society is interpreted as an experiment, then from the point of view of control over
the experiment we are dealing with a kind of experiment that is different from
traditional experiments in the natural and social sciences. In closing, let me point
briefly to a conception of experimentation that may be more appropriate to apply to
the introduction of new technologies in society. It is discussed in Ansell (2012) who
refers to this kind of experiments as ‘design experiments’. Here is how design
experiments are characterized (Ansell 2012, pp. 163–164):
‘‘Design experimentation starts with the presumption that the world is a messy
place and that experiments will not be able to isolate the effects of single
variables. In a design experiment, the experimenter presumes that the
experiment will interact with the totality of the setting in which the experiment
is conducted. The focus of a design experiment is not to definitely accept or
reject a hypothesis, but rather to iteratively refine the intervention (design-
redesign cycles). […] Design experiments do not create a sharp distinction
between researchers and subjects; instead, the practitioners often become
experimenters. […] In other words, design experiments do not fully control the
conditions in which the experiment occurs, as laboratory experiments attempt
to do.’’
So, in design experiments there is no clear-cut distinction between the
experimenter and the experimental system and nobody is in full control of the
experimental system. Such a notion of experiment may be more fruitful when
technological innovations are interpreted as social experiments. Ansell (2012,
p. 172) remarks that ‘‘…this approach to experimentation loses the powerful mode
of verification associated with controlled experiments (and for this reason, some
might argue that it is not experimental at all).’’ Apart from the loss of control,
however, there is yet another reason to question whether design experiments are
experiments at all. The focus of a design experiment is to redesign the intervention
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on the fly. In the case of the introduction of technological innovations in society this
means redesigning the technological innovation (and possibly redesigning its social
context). In my terminology that amounts to changing the kind of system on which
the experiment is performed. However, by changing the experimental system during
the experiment it is no longer clear what kind of experiment is being performed,
which means that it is no longer clear what is learned about what during the
experiment.
The foregoing analysis of treating technological innovations as experiments on
society is intended as a prolegomenon to discussions of the moral aspects of such
experiments that take the idea of the analogy with experiments in the natural and
social sciences seriously. I have tried to show that this analogy is rather problematic,
at least from the point of view of controlling the experimental system. If that is
indeed the case, caution is needed with the transfer of moral principles developed
for experiments in the natural and social sciences (such as informed consent) to
technological innovations conceived of as experiments on society.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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